Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Ironically, then, slaves need the external phenomena from which they claim to suffer, for without these constraints they themselves are nothing. Paul Patton New York: Routledge, The present paper is one attempt to disrupt this puzzling tendency in political theory scholarship.
Yet while Nietzsche clearly pre- sents things as developing this way, there is certainly no neces- sity that they do so. This is especially so when we remember that these phenomena need not be limited to other humans: the masterful type will experience everything from an avalanche to other people to the mall being closed as a kind of foreign, not- me obstacle in his path, one perhaps worth reckoning with but not otherwise worthy of extended reflection or rancor worthy of ridicule, perhaps, but only if he happens to bother with it for that long.
Second, and consequently, just because the slave perceives the external world — whether other humans or an av- alanche or the mall being closed — as hostile does not mean this external world actually is hostile. A slavish type understands and experi- ences himself as under siege — but this is a fact about the slave, not the external world, much less the masterful type. So, to return to the question asked at the outset of this paper: are all expenditures of strength justifiable for Nietzsche as, simply, expenditures of strength?
I think the answer to this question is no. Slave morality is problematic for Nietzsche insofar as what is slavish is whatever understands itself as derivative, and subsequently seeks retribu- tion against the phenomena it believes itself to be derivative of, thereby preserving the antagonistic relationship in a defensive and reactionary attempt at preserving itself.
Thus one can clear- ly condemn particular expenditures of strength insofar as they are slavish in this way, and condemnations of strength per se are not themselves slavish. Indeed, what Nietzsche laments in the triumph of the slave revolt in morality is the triumph of derivative, conservative, self-preservative vengefulness and the loss of mastery: honest, unselfconscious, self-affirmative activ- ity.
There is no reason to presume that those with political pow- er are strong in this particular, psychological way, or that those who suffer from impositions of political domination are weak in this particular, psychological way, either. This bond is unbreakable. The idea that Israel is under any existen- tial danger [from Iran] is fantasy. Is that an irrational fear? IV, April 13, There is no sanity [sanitas] in anyone who is displeased with your creation.
Sheed Indianapolis: Hackett, , 7. Translation modified. John C. Wu New York: St. Bernard Williams, trans. A supremely proper and scientific form of self- control, precisely because it requires no self at all, love of fate is an infinitely powerful protocol that one never need worry about, a perfectly implementable and unprogrammable rule whose ful- 4 Alexander R.
All objection to it is direct demonstration of the sheer insanity and psychic sickness of doing otherwise: your inane insistence on being something that cannot not fret, worry, fear. For the New Year. The chronic newness of the calendar year is null and void with- out the affirmation of ontological newness. The year is not new unless there is something new for it and something new that it is for.
This newness is provided through the topology of the wish which, in fulfillment of the polysemy of the preposition zum, traces the shape of the heart: interface of soul and body, thought and being — at once the place from which wishes spring and the place where one is oneself. Everything that lies before me is new, and it will not be long before I catch sight also of the terrifying face of my more distant 8 Augustine, Confessions, I must still be alive because I still have to think. The perfectly operative unworkability of the interface, a unilater- al duality of thought and life, exposes the terribly unending and inescapable suddenness of being trapped alive in consciousness, of finding oneself to be something like an always improper sum of thought and being.
Thought proves life and life proves nothing, nothing but itself, which is present to but not found in thought. The thing that seems to be thinking, that thinking suppos- edly presupposes, is impossible to face, being a kind of divinely stupid, supra-cogitational, immediate intelligence, wholly coin- cident with the inevitable impossibility or substantial negativity that one is. It is the immanent thing always already specularly on both sides of the thought—being dyad, independent of any com- munication between them whatsoever, and thus no thing at all.
Sum, ergo cogito; cogito, ergo sum. Christopher Middleton Indianapolis: Hackett, , Rather, thought and being are found here and now to have neither no relation equivoc- ity nor total relation univocity but the intelligible obscurity of some relation analogy. The generative leap of analogy traces without tracing how a being is new thought and a thought new being. Thought and being are interfacial. Neither steers, or can be steered by, the other. Such is the delusion of mistaking 13 Nietzsche, Selected Letters, Dante Alighieri, Paradiso, trans.
Charles S. Singleton Princeton: Prince- ton University Press, , This is the paradox which weakness, wanting to be in power rather than power itself, wanting to have freedom rather than be freedom itself, paradoxically wants not to be true. Interface cannot be steered, yet it is all the more in- timately and precisely steered, not by simply not steering it, but by a not-steering that steers steering itself.
Today everyone allows himself to express his dearest wish and thoughts. For the authentic or do-it-yourself truth of a wish is never something that can simply occur or arrive circumstan- tially, being a movement deeper than the wisher as such, big- ger than the self-image of the wish. Speaking a wish on this day works like a ritual destruction of wish that preserves it simultaneously against the perversity of the selfishly occult wish and the superficiality of merely wishing.
Voicing wish, passing it through the threshold of the mouth, enacts at once the sympathetic foretaste of its ful- fillment, a word-binding of its truth, and the renunciation of the wish as wish, a letting-go of the wish so that it may be, mysteri- ously at the moment of destruction, already true. Whence the link between wish and resolution. Knowing that a true wish cannot be spoken, such a one para- doxically becomes in the speaking of wish a perfect wisher, one who, not being above falling for having something to wish for, still ascends, by wishing beyond wishing, into the perfection of wishing nothing by wishing a wish that is its own fulfillment.
I, too, want to say what I wish from myself today and what thought first crossed my heart. Amor fati is found in open consciousness of heartfelt first- ness — a simple and not so simple matter, this clear knowing and seeing of what comes first, without the screen of any fear that would interrupt, avert, or ignore its arising. Everyone is ter- rified of doing this, petrified to the point of not being able to do it at all.
Proof: if there were freely offered, right now, a delicious and absolutely trustworthy candy that would immediately and forever cure you of all worry, how many of us would, without hesitation, swallow it whole? No, Nietzsche has your number: I find those people unpleasant in whom every natural incli- nation immediately becomes a sickness something disfigur- ing or even contemptible […]. What thought shall be the reason, warrant and sweetness of the rest of my life. The first thought is now rigorously decided and distinguished, via the decision itself, from fleeting impulse. What will be already is — where insanity sees this fact as foreclosure, sanity seizes it as the very source of openness, the ground of passing beyond what is, or better, living on the yonder side of end in both sens- es.
Furthermore, these terms restore wishing itself to its original auto-teleological unity, as shadowed in the etymol- ogy of the word Wunsch , cognate of venerate and win, whose root signifies both desire and satisfaction, to strive for and to gain. Amor fati is a winning wish, the wish of wish itself that needs no other. Love of fate directly fulfills the sweet bare promise of law itself, as what binds one to truth—beauty—goodness, without binding life to a ground or reason. Worrying binds. John W. I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them.
Thus I will be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love from now on! I do not want to wage war against ugliness; I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse the accusers. Let looking away be my only negation! Turn away, the world is stran- gling you in the loop of your own feedback — the seeing of this is turning away. No one really wants to hear it, above all the only part of you worth listening to. The specular spell is broken as in- terface is unveiled to be mirror, a reflecting pool of a weird un- graspable kind that cannot itself be wielded or turned as such, a multidimensional mirror in which the image is also always looking out.
Conversely, whoever fears, worries, frets, over anything, is in fact an imaginary steerless nothing, an evil in- existent imp who merely wants to rule, likes the idea of it, but will not. The powerful natures dominate, it is a necessity, they need not lift one finger. Princeton: Princeton University Press, , I leave that misfortunate task to progressivism and so-called positive thinking. However, one may understand the invisible radical power of amor fati, the farsightedness of its headless helmsman, in a manner that acknowledges the substantiality of its force without attempting to mediate its intrinsic worth and in this setting I suppose we must.
This prosthetic understand- ing, which preserves one against what McLuhan identifies as the autoamputative seductions of the interface, must be sought with respect to both the active and passive principles of amor fati. What seems to Be: Is. Suppose in this life we always had a mirror before us, in which we saw all things at a glance and recognized them in a single image, then neither action nor knowledge would be any hindrance to us.
But we have to turn from one thing to another, and so we can only attend to one thing at the ex- 24 William Blake, The Complete Poetry and Prose, ed. David V. Erdman New York: Doubleday, , — The active intellect cannot give what it has not got: and it cannot entertain two images to- gether; it has first one and then the other […]. But when God acts in place of the active intellect, He engenders many im- ages together in one point. And, all in all and on the whole: some day I want only to be a Yes-sayer! Scott Bakker NWW. Iii, October 1, Psychology is now once again the road to the fundamental problems.
The easy answer is: Achilles. But if you read Homer carefully, you see that the death of Hector is in fact a corporate enterprise. We are told shortly after the duel that death and fate seized him and dragged him down. Perhaps it was simply a misplaced humility, or a cunning moral prophylactic, a reluctance to take credit for what could turn into an obligation.
Whatever the reason, they were disinclined to see themselves as the sole authors of their thoughts and actions. The way we are taught to see ourselves. The way I saw myself up to the age of 14, the age my mother made the mistake of buying me an old manual typewriter at a local yard sale. I made the mistake of using it, you see, not just to type out adventures for my weekly Dungeons and Dragons ses- sions, but to think things through. All I know for certain is that my thoughts eventually fastened on the concept of cause. Its ubiquity. Its ex- planatory power. And at one point, I typed the following: Everything has a cause.
I had stumbled across determinism. The insight had the char- acter of a religious revelation for me, quite literally. I even wept, realizing not only that everything I had been taught was a lie, but that I was myself a kind of lie. I was an illusion weeping at my own illusoriness. How mad was that? Whenever I got high alone, I would listen to Pink Floyd or some such and just sit star- ing at my experience, trying to will my way through it, or dar- ing it to show its paltry hand. All of it. Bullshit, through and through!
I would sigh and look away from all the looked-at things, out a window, or through the fingers of a tree, and just exist in momentary impossibility. A vacancy absorbing space, as Helen Keller would say. This would be my second religious revelation — one that would ultimately lead to my disastrous tenure as a Branch Derridean. The facticity of my thrownness made a deep impres- sion on me. As did the ontological difference. Had to go and ruin it for everybody. It was a joyous, heady time for me.
Hemingway and Women: Female Critics and the Female Voice
Suddenly the world, which had been little more than a skin of mammalian lies when- ever I looked with my theoretical eyes, became positively soupy with meaning. I had been the proverbial man with a hammer — of course I had seen all questions as on- tic nails! At long last I could set aside the conceptual toolbox I had inherited from his well-intentioned, but ultimately deluded Euro-fathers.
Of course, I still waved my arms at parties, but this time the babes seemed to listen. I began practicing my Gallic shrug. How could I carry on the critique of meta- physics unless I immersed myself in the Western Tradition? Know thy enemy, no? Just who did the guy think he was fooling, really? To show just how hopeless Descartes was, I began returning to Nietzsche again and again and again in all of my undergradu- ate papers.
I was all, like, Beyond Good and Evil, like. I would always write, using a double hanging indent for dramatic purposes, it thinks, therefore I am. Combining the two, the Sartrean and Nietzschean, I arrived at a reformula- tion that I thought was distinctly my own: it thinks, therefore I was. Here, I would tell people, we see how well and truly fucked up things are. Not only do our origins congenitally outrun us, we continually outrun ourselves as well!
My professors lapped it up. The formula became my mantra, my originary repetition, even though it took quite some time to realize just how origi- nary it was. For some reason, it never dawned on me that I had come full circle — that at twenty-eight I had yet to take a sin- gle step beyond fourteen, intellectually speaking.
I had literally kept typing the same self-immolating thought through fourteen years and two life-transforming revelations. Over and over again. It would be a poker game, of all absurdities, that would bring this absurdity to light for me. Given my own heathen, positivistic past, I took it upon myself to convert the poor fool.
He was just an adolescent, after all — time to set aside childish thoughts! So I launched into an account of my own sorry history and how I had been saved by Heidegger and the ontological difference. The nihilist listened to me carefully, interrupting only to clarify this or that point with astute questions.
I had read enough by now to know this was the only sure thing in the humanities. It was an uncomfortable fact: outside the natural sciences there was no way short of exhaustion or conspiracy to end the regress of in- terpretation. I should have known. After all, I had only spent fourteen years repeating myself.
I lost my faith in intentionality. Heidegger changed my life because he convinced me that this was a loaded way of looking at things, that it begged apparently indefensible assumptions — and most importantly, a certain de- structive attitude toward being and life as it is lived. I regained my faith in intentionality. Even though I qualified that faith with Nietzsche, Sartre, and Derrida — particularly when it came to agency — my renewed faith in intentionality remained unques- tioned. What I had done, I now realize, is reconsider the same prob- lematic in intentional terms.
The problem of it had become safer, somehow, less conceptually corrosive. I be- came quite fond of my fragmented self hanging out in the grad pub with all my fragmented friends.
Is Conditional Immortality Biblically Viable?: Mark Bourne's Master's Thesis on Annihilationism
My old causal way of look- ing at things, it seemed to me, was juvenile, the presumption of someone bound in the ontic blinders of the scientific worldview. I even told the story I told above, the way I imagine born-again Christians are prone to tell stories of their youthful cognitive folly to fellow believers. Can you imagine? Determinativity is simply the degree of determination, the hot potato of efficacy. Can we say that all of these things possess determinativ- ity? None of them? We can mix and match, recast this and tweak that, and come up with entirely new theoretical outlooks if we want.
Spin the academic bottle. For better or worse, the only kind of determinativity we can follow with enough methodological and institutional rigor to actually re- solve as opposed to exhaust interpretative disputes is causal- ity — whatever the hell that is. As Richard Dawkins is so fond of pointing out in interviews, scientists — unlike us — can actually agree on what will change their minds. And this, as the past five centuries have amply demonstrated, is a powerful thing.
Grasping a problem or a theory or a concept is never enough. By some astound- ing coincidence, I had relegated science using precisely the same self-aggrandizing theoretical tactic used by all my friends. I mean, who did those scientists think they were, waving around their big 3 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, They were so obviously blind to the conditions of their discourse… In other words, I had used my prior commitment to What Science Was — a social construct, a language game, an expres- sion of the metaphysics of presence — to condition my com- mitment to What Science Does, which is explicate natural phe- nomena in causal terms.
My domain was nothing less than the human soul, and the last I checked, science was the product of human souls: if anything, science was a subset of my domain, not vice versa. So I once believed, more or less. Two kinds of ignorance, it now seems to me, are required to make this family of assumptions convincing beyond the social psychological dimensions of belief acquisition, such as the hun- ger for belonging and prestige. First, you need to be unaware of what we now know about human cognition and its apparent limitations.
Second, you need to know next to nothing about the physiology of the human soul. The New Psychologist The first ignorance, I have come to think, is nothing short of astounding, and demonstrates the way the humanities, which are so quick to posture themselves as critical authorities, are simply of a piece with our sham culture of pseudo-empower- ment and fatuous self-affirmation.
For decades now, cognitive psychologists have been dismantling our flattering cognitive as- sumptions, compiling an encyclopedic inventory of the biases, fallacies, and outright illusions that afflict human cognition. Please bear with me as I read through the following partial! Tedious, I know, but some cognitive shortcomings, such as the Semmelweis reflex where paradigm-incompatible evidence is rejected out-of-hand or exception biases where individuals think themselves immune to the failings of others , need to be bludgeoned into submission.
This inventory of cognitive foibles has lead many psycholo- gists, perhaps not surprisingly, to rethink the function of reason and argumentation. The traditional view of reason as a cognitive instrument, a tool we use to produce new knowledge out of old, has been all but overturned. The story has to be far more compli- cated than mere cognition: even though evolution has devised many, many imperfect tools, rarely do the imperfections line up so neatly.
All too often, reason seems to fail precisely where and when we need it to. My own reservations with Argumentative Theory of Reason stem from a failure to discriminate between various contexts of reasoning, or to consider the role played by ambiguity. In either case, my guess is that balance between the epistemic and the egocentric dimensions of reasoning varies according to social and semantic circumstances. Human reason evolved in social conditions far different than our own, at a time when almost all our relationships were at once relationships of material in- terdependency — when our lives literally depended on face-to- face consensus and cooperation.
Human theoretical incompetence actually explains why we required the methodological and institutional apparatuses of science to so miraculously transform the world. In my own view, this is precisely what we should expect. We now know that only a frac- tion of the estimated 38, trillion operations per second pro- cessed by the brain finds its way to consciousness.
This means that experience, all experience, is profoundly privative, a sim- plistic caricature of otherwise breathtakingly complex process- es. We want to think that this loss of information is synoptic, that despite its relative paucity, experience nevertheless captures some functional kernel of its correlated neurological functions. But there are telling structural and developmental reasons to think otherwise. The fact that these fictions appear to play efficacious roles should come as no surprise, since they need only be systematically related to actually efficacious brain functions.
This second ignorance, you might object, is anything but problematic, since the human soul has always been an open question. It has be- come an empirical one. One of the great paradoxes of human cognition is the way ignorance, far more than knowledge, serves as the foundation of certainty. For years I had tackled the question of the human soul using the analytic and speculative tools belonging to the humanities — and I had done so with absolute confidence.
Sure, I realized that there was no definitive way to arbitrate between alternatives. But I had embraced a theoretical outlook that seemed to make a virtue out of these apparent liabilities. Even more importantly, I had secured a privileged social identity. I… was the radical one.
I… was the one asking the difficult questions. I… was the truly critical one. I understood the way my subject position had been culturally and historically conditioned.
- Geld regiert die Welt.: Wer regiert das Geld? (German Edition).
- Medievalism and the Gothic in Australian Culture | Making the Middle Ages.
- Session One: Boundaries in Theory!
I realized that all theory was laden, warped by the weight of innumerable implicit as- sumptions. Where scientists and, well, every other human on planet were constrained by their ignorance of their assumptions, un- witting agents of a benighted and pernicious conceptual status quo, I understood the oh-so-onerous burden of culture and his- tory — and so thought I could work around them, with a little luck. Besides, I wanted to think I was a non-conformist contrarian iconoclastic radi- cal.
I needed an outlook to match my culture-jamming T-shirts. But the ugly, perhaps monstrous, fact remains. If the cognitive psychologists are right and reasoning — outside of a narrow family of contexts — is profoundly flawed, far more egocentric than epistemic, then the humanities are stranded with a box of broken tools. If the eliminativists and revisionists are right and consciousness is itself a kind of cognitive illusion, then the very subject-matter of the humanities awaits scientifically legitimized redefinition. If these two ignorances were all that kept us safe, then we are about to become extinct.
Inventing the New Which brings me back to the remarkable exception that is Nietzsche. Neither of the ignorances described above, I think, would surprise him in the least. The notion that reasoning is motivated is a pervasive theme throughout his work. Where the philosophical tradition assumed that intuition, observation, and logical necessity primarily motivated reason — he proposes breakfast, weather, cleanliness, or abode.
Now I appreciate that he is so very much more, that he was actually thinking past post-structuralism a century before it. And I realize that his continual references to physiology — and other empirical wheels that never seemed to turn — are in fact every bit as central as their frequency suggests. Consider the fol- lowing quote, one which I think can only be truly appreciated now: 12 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans.
To be sure, when the new psychologist puts an end to the superstition which has hitherto flourished around the soul-idea with almost tropical luxuriance, he has as it were thrust himself out into a new wilderness and a new mistrust — it may be that the older psychologists had a mer- rier and more comfortable time of it; ultimately, however, he sees that, precisely that act, he has also condemned himself to inventing the new — and who knows?
Nietzsche was as much futurist as intellectual historian, an annalist of endangered and collapsing conceptual ecosystems. He understood that the Enlightenment would not stop exploding our ingrown vanities, that sooner or later the an- thropos would fall with the anthropomorphic. Of course he did. So much of what we believe is simply a matter of who or what gets to us first. The goal of this strategy has been to show you the cognitive fragility of your ecosystem, and thus your inevitable demise as an intellectual species. During this time, however, one stubborn corner of the natural world remained relatively immune to this process simply because of the sheer complexity of its func- tions: the human brain.
As a result, the discursive traditions that took the soul as their domain were spared the revolution that swept away the old, anthropomorphic discourses of the physical world. So long as the causal precursors of thought remain shrouded, anything goes, theoretically speaking.
As the one family of interrelated domains where intentional speculation retained something of its ancient cognitive gravitas, the humanities pro- vided a discursive space where specialists could still intention- ally theorize without fear of embarrassing themselves. So long as we discharged our discursive obligations with domain-specif- ic erudition and intelligence, we could hold our heads up high with in-group pride. The walls of the brain have been overrun. The intentional bas- tions of the soul are falling.
Culinary Aesthetics and Practices in Nineteenth-Century American Literature | SpringerLink
Taken together, the sciences of the mind and brain are developing a picture that in many cases out-and-out contradicts many of the folk-psychological intui- tions that underwrite so much speculation within the humani- ties. IV, April 13, In the s, fleeing a cholera epidemic in Berlin, Schopenhauer writes the following in his notebook: When I was seventeen, without any proper schooling, I was affected by the misery and wretchedness of life, as was the Buddha when in his youth he caught sight of sickness, old age, pain and death […] the result for me was that this world could not be the work of an all-bountiful, infinitely good being, but rather of a demon who had summoned into existence creatures in order to gloat over the sight of their anguish and agony.
Payne Oxford: Berg, , But Schopenhauer also makes reference to another origin of pessimism that is unconditional, a kind of metaphysical suf- fering that is tantamount to existing itself, regardless of our at- tempts to tailor everything to the sufficient reasons that form the bedrock of philosophy and its realist impulse — all forms of access are at best shadow plays that, in the end, mock the human form.
But this metaphysical pessimism must fail — by definition — and Schopenhauer is forced to digress either into grumpy rants, or obscure evocations of the nihil negativum. He writes: One day I found this book in a second-hand bookshop, picked it up as something quite unknown to me and turned the pages. Once at home, I threw 2 Ibid. But the stakes are high, perhaps too high — even for Nietzsche. One usually sells a book back out of disappointment. Occasionally, one sells a book back out of enthusiasm.
Phosphorescent, moss-ridden aphorisms inseparable from the thickness and os- sification of our own bodies, inseparable from the stillness of breathing. Was Schopenhauer aware that he himself was a fourth type of writer… the black hole? If we were to take this up, perhaps the best place to look for incomplete thoughts would be in the notebooks of philosophers.
Nietzsche himself was a fastidious user of his notebooks, often writing on the right-hand side only and then flipping the notebook over, allowing him to fill notebooks front- to-back and back-to-front. Schopenhauer, no less fastidious than Nietzsche, preferred to keep several notebooks going at once, notebooks of all sizes and types — octavo, quarto, folio, bound and unbound. Some note- books remained fixed on his desk at home, while others could be taken with him on walks, and still other notebooks were reserved for traveling. And then there is Cioran, that gloomy prowler of the Latin Quarter, who was fond of the bright, multi- colored, spiral notebooks used by students….
Nietzsche: life is a tight-rope. Kafka: life is a trip-rope. Schopenhauer: life is a noose. Cioran: life is a noose, improperly tied. Admittedly, Pascal is partially to blame for the confusion. He wrote his many fragments on large sheets of paper, separating each by a horizontal line.
When a sheet was full, he would then cut the paper along the horizontal lines, so that each fragment was self-contained on a strip of paper. These strips of paper where then grouped into piles. Pascal then poked a hole in the top corner of each of the strips and joined them by running a thread through the hole, forming a bundle. Many of the bun- dles were thematically grouped — for instance, fragments on human vanity, or boredom, or religious despair were each sewn together. What the reader confronts is a book that is, in every way, unbound. What strikes me is the care Pascal put into his bundles, threading them together like fabric, or like a wound.
There it might fester and flower forth from his chest in lyrical, tendril-like growths of unreflective black opal, gradually submerging his en- tire body — and later his corpse — into so many distillate specks of ashen thought. What begins with the scintillating architectonics of Kant ends up crumbling into dubious arguments, irascible indictments against humanity, nocturnal evocations of the vanity of all being, and stark, apho- ristic phrases entombed within dense prose, prose that trails off in meditations on nothingness.
Perhaps, counter to what the scholars say, Schopenhauer was right about Buddhism, though his is a funereal Buddhism, in which sorrow and a silent smile seamlessly overlap. Schopenhauer, the depressive Kantian. If you have personal access to this content, log in with your username and password here:. Author: Stephanie Trigg. Your Access Options. Log In If you have personal access to this content, log in with your username and password here: Email or username: Password: Remember me. Forgotten your password? We had infiltrated a carefully orchestrated public relations event organized by various members of the drug control industry and done our best to expose the negative consequences of drug prohibition.
This action made for great television and the broadcast was played repeatedly on the local public access channel. By the time we left, we had been photographed numerous times by DEA agents, which we took as indicative of our success. Little did I know at the time, my performance would make me somewhat of a local celebrity. In the months after the event, numerous strangers would stop me in the supermarket and say that they had seen me on T.
This action solidified my resolve to challenge drug policy. The cavalier reaction of the panelists to our challenges and the attempt to intimidate us by D. One way that I stay aware of what various organizations are doing is through the social networking site, "Facebook. Organization of Chapters I have organized the dissertation into six chapters and a brief conclusion. Although the six chapters fit together to detail the pre -history and history of medical marijuana in California, they are also intended to be independent analyses of different aspects of drug policy reform.
Consequently each chapter uses different theoretical lenses, samples of relevant literature and combinations of research methods to seek answers to diverse research questions. The six chapters link together to first situate my narrative of medical marijuana within the historical contexts of drug prohibition and drug policy reform. In the first three chapters I provide an analysis of drug prohibition, the history of the movement, and the spatial and organizational diffusion of drug policy reform.
In the final three chapters, I analyze the medical marijuana movement in California as a case study of the wider movement's biggest success. A major goal of the dissertation is to provide a social history of both the wider drug 33 policy reform movement and the more focused medical marijuana branch of the movement. To my knowledge, this social history has not been written before, and narrating it with fidelity was both challenging and rewarding.
It is my hope that each chapter is able to stand independently from the larger work, but that they are integrated to compose a richly contextualized and detailed narrative. In addition to contributing to the sociology of social movements and the sociology of drugs, providing the social history of the drug policy reform movement is an important product of my research. In chapter one, I seek to provide historical context for my study. By tracing the evolution of prohibition through its U. I begin the chapter with a brief review of relevant sociological literature and a short sketch of the historical development of prohibition, as drugs became the target of state and federal laws one by one.
Next, I analyze the discourse of prohibition using conceptual tools from the sociology of affect. My goal in this chapter is to show the entrenched rhetoric and emotion of drug prohibition to give the reader an idea of the task confronting the drug policy reform movement. In chapter two I use in depth interviews, archival materials, and Internet research to trace the development of the drug policy reform movement. I theorize the movement as made up of three branches; marijuana law reform, harm reduction, and anti-prohibitionism.
My analysis of the movement is guided by concepts from the social movement literature including insights and categories from Resource 34 Mobilization theory. After a discussion of the historical context of the s, I give an in-depth analysis of the development and decline of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws in the s. I use the categories of Resource Mobilization to emphasize the role of social movement organizations in the movement and to conceptualize the ways the various organizations in the movement relate to one another and funding sources as a social movement industry beginning in the s.
After a brief detour through the harm reduction movement in the late s and s, I trace the rise of the anti-prohibitionist branch and how it relates to the two earlier branches of drug policy reform. I close the chapter with a brief description of the current state of the movement and the chief areas of concern for its participants. In chapter three I seek to highlight the sites of activity for the drug policy reform movement.
My goal is to address a lack of focus on physical space and location in the social movement literature. This chapter sprang from my fieldwork and represents a foray into "grounded theory. To theorize the role of such events I sought to build on the existing concept of repertoires of contention. I discuss some of he insights I gleaned from attending movement events, including points of contention, issue framing and the role of emotions.
In chapter four, I use political process theory to analyze the birth of medical marijuana in the San Francisco Bay Area in the early s. I theorize the unique 35 political opportunity structures that gave rise to the early medical marijuana movement. Next, I highlight the role of resources, social movement organizations, and elite benefactors in the campaign to legalize medical marijuana at the state level through the Proposition ballot initiative.
Finally, I analyze the rise of dispensaries and trace their evolution from cannabis buyers' clubs to medical cannabis dispensary collectives. I also examine the importance of dispensaries as sites of continued movement activity. Chapter five, "A Tale of Three Cities" looks at medical marijuana dispensaries and how the regulatory climate and political opportunity structures of three different metro areas in the state affect the number and type of dispensaries that take root.
By looking at the varying experiences of San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego with the regulation of medical marijuana, I analyze both the structure of political opportunities and the ways that activists alter those structures. Using interview data, observations from attending City meetings, and official City documents, I focus on the ways that medical cannabis providers participate in the political process that affects them. Theoretically, this chapter builds a dynamic view of the concept of political opportunity structures. By looking at the variety of tools that activists use to change the opportunity structures they confront, this chapter also serves as a model for future drug policy reform activists.
Chapter six looks at the transition of medical marijuana from a social movement to an industry and the way that the hybrid movement straddles the fields a 36 la Bourdieu of activism and commerce. I argue that the hybrid status of medical marijuana is unique among social movements and an interesting site for empirical exploration and theory building. Hybrid status also brings significant tensions for participants, and these tensions have developed into pronounced fault lines and factions. As articulated by movement leaders in a series of panel discussions, the hybrid character of the medical marijuana movement and how it should relate to the wider movement for drug policy reform are hotly contested issues.
Chapter six concludes by looking at how the state has recently responded to the drug policy reform and medical marijuana movements, and the prospects for drug policy reform in the future. After presenting relevant sociological literature and tracing the history of drug prohibition, I analyze the arguments, rhetoric, and imagery that proponents of prohibition have employed over its relatively brief history.
Central to my analysis is a discussion of the emotions that anchor prohibitionist discourse to its cherished subjects, and how Gordon's concept of "haunting" can illuminate the workings of drug prohibition. The drug policy reform movement is essentially engaging in an argument with the proponents of prohibition about the merits of the approach. With the advent of the Internet, the proliferation of drug policy reform groups, and their increasing ability to represent reformist discourse in the mass media, participants in the movement are increasingly able to counter the powerful discourse of punitive prohibition.
Additionally, as the number of medical marijuana dispensaries has grown, popular culture and news media have made their depiction a favorite subject. The drug policies pursued in the United States present a complex enigma. Penalties for use are among the most stringent in the world, yet Americans are more likely to use illicit drugs than people in comparable nations. The federal government 38 remains adamantly opposed to drug policy liberalization, but states including California and Colorado allow and facilitate truly revolutionary approaches to the provision of medical cannabis.
Why have policy makers and drug control agencies pursued an approach that favors supply reduction, over demand reduction or harm reduction? Supply reduction depends on police and prisons, whereas supply reduction rests on treatment and prevention. Why have drug policy actors used the criminal law and the punitive capacity of the state as the chief instruments of drug control?
And why have drug policy actors depended on stigmatizing drug users to marshal support for the policies of punitive prohibition? Although these questions are addressed in this chapter, my overarching focus is how the sponsors of drug prohibition marshal support for its reproduction. Using theoretical insights from the sociology of affect, and my concept of "the means of representation" I analyze the longevity and seductiveness of prohibitionist ideology. Existing Literature on Drug Prohibition The story of drug prohibition in the United States is complex and multifaceted.
Several noted sociologists have analyzed aspects of this history. Gusfield examined the symbolic uses of alcohol prohibition, Becker looked at the role of "moral entrepreneurs" in garnering support for cannabis prohibition, while Duster looked at the shifting demography and consequent status of opiate addicts and the how morality becomes the province of legislation. In a article, Himmelstein dubbed these studies "drug politics theory.
Although Spector and Kitsuse did not formally delineate the constructionist approach until the early s, the work of Gusfield and Duster presaged the turn toward constructionism. Within sociology, constructionist approaches to drug prohibition are prominent among narratives about the origin and reproduction of drug prohibition. Reinarman and Levine explored the demonization of crack cocaine for political purposes, while Beckett showed how politicians constructed drug problems to build consensus around the "hegemonic project" of curtailing the welfare state while increasing the carceral organs of the U.
Reinarman argues that "drug scares" recur frequently in U. Reinarman 92 seeks to understand the "appeal" of anti-drug claims in a nation characterized by "recurring anti-drug crusades and a history of repressive anti-drug laws. They are usually based on a "kernel of truth" subject to "media magnification [through] the routinization of caricature," where worst-case scenario anecdotes are amplified and circulated. Drug scares are the work of mostly self-interested "politico- moral entrepreneurs," expanding Becker's concept to the peculiar political capital afforded to American politicians by appearing "tough on drugs," with no risk of alienating donors or the electorate Reinarman With alcohol, opium and the local phase of cannabis prohibition, American drug control actors were essentially using the drug law to control ethnic minorities.
Gusfield theorized that proponents of alcohol prohibition Drys were engaging in "status politics" with wets. With opium and cannabis, others have argued that the regime of drug control was an alternative means of enforcing cultural discipline Bonnie and Whitebread According to Reinarman 97 , during successive drug scares, professional groups played prominent roles by generating and controlling the "public definition of a problem. The concept of "drug scares," supports my analysis of drug prohibition and its discourse. I seek to deepen the analysis of these earlier theorists by using newer theoretical inroads provided by affect studies.
Although historians trace the impulse to prohibit the ingestion of some psychoactive drugs to early European colonialism Campos ; Schivelbusch , policy makers did not install a formal system to eradicate the use of certain drugs until the dawn of the Twentieth century. The system of drug prohibition sprang 41 from a confluence of interests between elements of the Progressive movement and the U.
The temperance movement was instrumental in incubating prohibitionist ideology. When combined with racism, xenophobia, and potent "drug scares" early prohibitionist ideology would be formalized to first prohibit the smoking of opium in Western states in the late 19 th Century, alcohol in , and cannabis in Reinarman In the U.
As constructed through discourse, drug policy is an example of the nexus between knowledge and power par excellence. According to Foucault , " Through policy, actors are able to naturalize and systemize "regimes of truth" that create subjects who are forbidden to use certain psychoactive drugs. Through the discourse of "punitive prohibition" Reinarman and Levine and the representations it deploys, drug policies are legitimized and sustained.
Proponents of drug prohibition, primarily those working in the "drug control industrial complex" garner support for such policies by representing the discursive formation of punitive prohibition in popular media, professional literature and government reports. I term the various forms of mass media, professional literature 42 and government reports the means of representation. The forms of media available to both proponents and opponents of prohibition have increased throughout the twentieth century. In addition to newspapers, pamphlets and books in the late 19 th century, radio, television and the Internet have diversified the means of representation throughout the twentieth century.
Popular culture, including novels, film, music, and television shows have also been important albeit more contested sites for representing the discourse of prohibition. The advent of the Internet has done the most to democratize access to the means of representation.
Customers who bought this item also bought
In turn the drug policy reform movement has greatly expanded its ability to challenge the discourse of prohibition by using the Internet, a topic I turn to in greater detail in chapter three. A Brief History of Drug Prohibition When the Spanish invaded Tenochtitlan in , the Aztecs employed a large pharmacopoeia of plants for spiritual, medicinal and presumably recreational purposes Cocker Spanish clergymen soon forbade the use of many of these drugs and even destroyed extensive records of plant knowledge in an effort to destroy all traces of Aztec culture.
Upon their arrival in the new world, the Franciscans found Peyote evil and sought to ban its use. In the Spanish Inquisition was introduced into Mexico, and in it officially declared use of peyote to be the "work of the devil" Anderson , and issued a ban on its use. An early 17th century manual for Priests entitled Camino del Cielo, Road to Heaven , instructed them to ask Indian penitents: "Dost thou suck the blood of others, or dost thou wander about at night, calling upon the demon to help thee?
Has thou drunk peyotl, or hast thou 43 given it to others to drink, in order to find out secrets, or to discover where stolen or lost articles were Anderson 7? How many have you murdered? Have you eaten the flesh of man? Have you eaten peyote? When soldiers and seafarers began to popularize the vice from the western hemisphere in Europe and Asia in the seventeenth century leaders moved to outlaw its use.
According to conservative historian David Courtwright : English smokers risked the disapproval of James I, who declaimed against the Stygian weed. Russian smokers suffered beatings and exile; snuff-takers had their noses torn off. Chinese smokers had their heads impaled on pies. Turkish smokers under the reign of Ahmed I endured pipe stems thrust through their noses; Murad IV ordered them tortured to death.
Priests who indulged in tobacco during Mass. Despite such stringent opposition tobacco had become wildly popular by the eighteenth century Schivelbusch The fortunes of European empires from the 16 th to the 20 th centuries were inexorably tied to the creation of a large international commerce in psychoactive drugs.
Courtwright argues that psychoactive compounds played an instrumental role in the globalization of the modern world. He shows that drugs, especially caffeine, alcohol and tobacco, were integral parts of colonial economies. These compounds also had significant effects on granting people access to a means of 44 consciousness alteration that had been unknown prior to global ocean-based commerce. According to Trocki 10 , "Opium was crucial to the expansion of the British Empire during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and without it, there may have been no Empire at all.
Extracts of cannabis, opium, morphine, and cocaine were frequently incorporated into "patent medicines" that were commonplace in the U. Primarily a measure to insure purity in the food supply, the Pure Food and Drug Act of , was an early victory of the Progressive movement. Among other things, the law required the makers of patent medicines to label the derivatives of opium, cocaine, and cannabis that had been hiding in benevolent sounding tonics and snake oil medicines alike.
Once the special ingredients became known, Americans reduced their intake by roughly one third. In a amendment to the law, intended to curtail the patent medicine trade more directly, prohibited "any medicines containing habit-forming drugs from interstate commerce except under the prescription of a physician" Musto According to Musto the amendment was: an important trade victory for the retail and compounding pharmacists, for it would increase dispensing by pharmacists, decrease sales in grocery stores, and eliminate sales across state lines by mail-order houses P. It sought to first limit and then eliminate alcohol consumption in the U.
Although the leading intellectuals of temperance would shift, from Dr. Benjamin Rush to Lyman Beecher to Frances Willard and Wayne Wheeler Musto ; Okrent , the movement developed a central ideology by the late 19 th that would have long echoing effects for both alcohol and drug prohibition. According to Reinarman and Levine :. In phase one, "Temperance represents the reaction of the old Federalist aristocracy to loss of political, social, and religious dominance in American society.
The eventual success of the movement in achieving alcohol prohibition was also predicated on xenophobia, virulent racism, and ideology that pitted "native" born Protestants against largely Catholic immigrants from Germany, Ireland, and Italy, during the second phase of the movement. Two distinct organizations dominated each phase of the movement. During the first, or temperance, phase of the movement the Women's Christian Temperance Union WCTU , became the dominant organization when it formed in Many members of the WCTU were suffragists, and participation in the organization was often the only avenue to political participation available to women in the late 19 th century.
According to Gusfield , by the s, Temperance and Populism were both animated by a "sense of conflict with urban, industrial communities. The Anti-Saloon League spearheaded the concerted push for legislation that prohibited the use of alcohol. By the time the ASL formed in , several states had already voted themselves Dry, beginning with Kansas in The amendment depended on a fortuitous confluence of Progressive victories including the passage of the national income tax, women achieving the right to vote and a swelling of anti-German sentiment during World War I. As described by Okrent : The income tax had made a prohibition amendment fiscally feasible.
The social revolution wrought by the suffragists had made it politically plausible. Now the Drys had the final tool they needed to wedge the amendment into the Constitution: a war. When the Volstead Act was passed in to provide for the enforcement of the eighteenth amendment, the formal prohibition period began. The formal prohibition of alcohol was characterized by Utopian thinking that resurfaces among later drug prohibitionists; the idea that alcohol was the root of social problems, its elimination was possible and feasible, and its elimination would lead to a perfect society.
The iconic preacher Billy Sunday captured this sentiment with the proclamation he made upon the passage of the Volstead Act: The reign of tears is over. The slums will soon be only a memory. We will turn our prisons into factories and our jails into storehouses and corncribs.
Men will walk upright now, women will smile, and the children will laugh. Hell will be forever for rent. Okrent 2. Despite the earnest intent of its backers, prohibition did not stop the flow of alcohol. Instead it diverted alcohol into more lucrative and underground channels. While the number of drinkers dropped modestly, prohibition created both semi-licit and completely illicit ways to buy and sell alcohol.
The byproducts of these alternate 48 commercial channels were huge spikes in violent crime, graft, bootlegging and boondoggle spending Okrent The Utopian idea that the state had the ability to eliminate alcohol consumption and consequently the majority of social problems resurfaces in the name of the organization "Partnership for a Drug-Free America" and the stated goals of the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the U.
Office of Drug Control; the complete eradication of illicit drugs. Racist attitudes were prominent among the overwhelmingly "native" born whites that made up the lion's share of the Drys. Anti-immigrant, primarily anti- German, anti- Jewish, anti-Italian, and anti-Irish sentiment played a prominent role in the temperance movement especially during the final push for the eighteenth amendment. In the Southern U. Strong currents of racism, xenophobia, and anti-immigrant sentiment were also prominent in three related episodes of federal drug prohibition; the banning of opium in , the Harrison Narcotics Act of and the Marihuana Tax Act of Although opium did not become subject to prohibition at the Federal level until , its use was outlawed at the local and state level much earlier.
Beginning in the late s, local authorities moved to prohibit the smoking of opium in the Western U. From roughly to , many states and cities moved to outlaw the use of opium Musto , but did nothing to control the use of pharmaceutical narcotics Courtwright This 49 policy targeted the Chinese and white petty criminals for using one form of opium and exempted native-born whites for using different forms of the same compound.
The first non-alcohol drug laws passed in the U. As Chinese immigrants moved into California cities after completing work on the railroads in the s, xenophobia and racism typified the response of white English speaking Californians. Ironically, San Francisco, auspiciously the birthplace of the drug policy reform movement , was the first city to pass a law banning the operation of opium dens in An California law penalizing both patrons and operators of opium dens followed the San Francisco ban Goode In , Congress banned Chinese immigrants from coming to the U.
Although cities and states banned opium smoking, they did nothing to curtail the much more widespread consumption of morphine and opium in "patent medicines" such as laudanum Duster ; Courtwright During the late nineteenth century most narcotic addicts were not Chinese immigrants or professional gamblers, but affluent native-born whites, mostly women.
When white women injected morphine and imbibed opium in the form of the liquid laudanum , claims makers official and popular alike did not portray such behavior as criminal but as a tragic or unfortunate consequence of medical treatment Courtwright Traditional images of drug use feature marginalized individuals 50 whose behavior violates both social and legal norms, whereas iatrogenic drug users are cast as victims.
The effort to sponsor international narcotic prohibition soon led to a drive for domestic prohibition in the U. After gaining possession of the Philippines from Spain in the Spanish- American war, some colonial authorities most notably the Episcopal Bishop Brent wrote of their dismay at the population of Chinese opium addicts, and of U.
President Roosevelt commissioned Brent to investigate the drug distribution system in the Philippines and three commissioners from the state department were selected Bullington ; Bewley-Taylor ; Musto Most ambitious of the three, was Dr. Hamilton Wright, who in the spring of , became a tireless advocate for a Shanghai Convention on the international prohibition of opium and its chemical cousins.
To strengthen the position of the U. The goal of national narcotic prohibition led Wright to become the chief advocate for what would eventually become the Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act of Musto Musto details the role of moral entrepreneurs, federal legislation and Supreme Court decisions in implementing both domestic and international drug prohibition.
He pays special attention to the period of morphine maintenance and the role of the Treasury Department in regulating and eventually shutting down morphine 51 maintenance through a series of Supreme Court decisions that re-interpreted the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of From to , as the Treasury Department arrested doctors under the new interpretation of federal drug law, doctors began to stop prescribing morphine to their addicted patients. The passage of the Harrison Narcotics Act was a profoundly important moment in the history of drug prohibition.
Unlike the alcohol prohibition under the Volstead Act, this legislation actually criminalized drug users, creating a new class of deviants. It was the key moment in the early implementation of drug prohibition. Duster documents demographic shifts in the population of narcotic addicts in the first decades of the twentieth century and the resulting criminalization of narcotics under the Harrison Act.
Individuals who promoted drug prohibition, such as Hamilton Wright, sought to marshal support for their efforts by harnessing the virulent currents of American racism against the Chinese in the West and African- Americans in the South Marez , Musto , Torrans Somewhat transparently the title of the second major piece of federal drug control legislation, The Smoking Opium Exclusion Act of , is remarkably similar to the title of the earlier anti-immigrant Chinese Exclusion Act of Shelden The push for federal cannabis prohibition came later than alcohol and "narcotic" prohibition.
Although some states outlawed cannabis in the s, Congress did not pass the Marihuana Tax Act until Historian Isaac Campos traces the ideology behind cannabis prohibition to Mexico in the late nineteenth century. He looks to the depiction of cannabis in official documents 52 during and after the colonial period, and its representation in popular Mexican literature and cartoons. Numerous historical accounts of cannabis maintain that cannabis smoking was a common practice in Mexico Bonnie and Whitebread ; Musto ; Sloman Campos questions the accuracy of this view.
According to Campos , the symbolic importance of cannabis does not stem from its widespread use, but from the complete marginality of its use and users. The conflation of cannabis intoxication with the effects of other psychoactive plant drugs in Mexico including peyote and the morning glory plant also contributed to the reputation of cannabis as a fantastically dangerous drug. The "killer weed" myth discussed later by Himmelstein actually originates in Mexico.
Popular descriptions of the drug as leading to violence have long echoing effects for its criminalization on both sides of the border. Mexican laborers began to move to Texas and New Mexico in search of work during the early s. These workers brought the vice of smoking "Rosa Maria" with them, and soon drug stores, grocers, and mail order companies were providing a supply of imported cannabis from Mexico. According to Bonnie and Whitebread 32 , "the plant and its intoxicant use encountered a hostile political and social climate.
The first ban was passed in El Paso in A U. Department of Agriculture report from Texas alleged that in addition to Mexicans, cannabis use was popular with "Negroes, prostitutes, pimps and a criminal class of whites," and its use was tied to violent behavior. In , the Treasury Department banned the import of cannabis for non- medical purposes, but this ban was largely ineffective. According to Bonnie and Whitebread 51 , although the FBN would agitate for strict control of cannabis in the mids, "from to , twenty-nine states, including seventeen west of the Mississippi, prohibited use of the drug for non-medical purposes.
The following Chicago Tribune article exhibits the shift from the anti-Mexican sentiment of early cannabis control efforts to later appeals premised on a threat to children Himmelstein : The number of addicts is growing alarmingly according to authorities The habit was introduced a dozen years ago or so by Mexican laborers There being no legal ban such as makes other drugs scarce, 'loco weed' is cheap.
In the s, growing pressure from local prosecutors, law enforcement and health officials would put the impetus for a federal law on the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Faced with growing pressure from local and state authorities to do something about cannabis, Anslinger began to lobby for the passage of the Marijuana Tax Act in To gain support for the passage of the act Anslinger' s FBN portrayed cannabis as a "killer weed.
Since so little was known about cannabis prior to the s, the FBN and other interested parties were able to dominate the discussion of cannabis effects up until its use became widespread in the s Himmelstein The Marijuana Tax Act was passed with little debate and only one objection from the American Medical Association in At the time of the Act's passage, Congress was reluctant to regulate what people could possess, so instead they relied on a duplicitous taxation scheme. The scheme relied on a complicated tax structure, which effectively dissuaded physicians from using the drug in medical practice Brecher et al.
Although Becker  argues that the passage of the Tax Act was largely due to Anslinger's work as a "moral entrepreneur," Himmelstein contends that the need for the act was ironically spurred by the FBN's desire for the passage of the Uniform State Narcotics Act and not out from a desire to increase its sway. After the passage of the act, the FBN began a fruitless campaign to arrest a large number of jazz musicians for smoking cannabis in a dramatic sweep. The FBN was able to maintain its dominance of cannabis ideology for another twenty years, but it was forced to update its rationale for cannabis prohibition Keys and Galliher